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Moxey, White and Ozanne (1999) have shown how transfer payments coupled with input quotas 
can  be  used  to  design  optimal  truth-telling  mechanisms  for  voluntary  agri-environmental 
schemes under hidden information about compliance costs. Ozanne, Hogan and Colman (2001) 
adapted  the  Moxey  et  al.  model  to  analyze  hidden  action  in  such  schemes,  analyzing  the 
relationships between input  abatement,  the  cost of monitoring compliance and farmers’ risk 
preferences. White (2002) extended the Moxey et al. model to analyze the design of contracts 
under both hidden action and hidden information, but used an input charge/transfer payment 
approach rather than the original input quota/transfer payment one. In addition, he assumed 
that farmers caught cheating face a variable fine, related to the amount of input they apply in 
excess of the amount agreed in the contract, rather than a fixed fine as assumed by Ozanne et al. 
White argues that his results show that an input charge/transfer payment policy is more efficient 
than a quota when the regulator cannot observe compliance costs of individual farmers. This 
paper  integrates  the  previous  work,  developing  a  model  of  both  hidden  action  and  hidden 
information in agri-environmental schemes based on the input quota/transfer payment approach 
of Moxey et al. (1999) and Ozanne et al. (2001), rather than the input charge/transfer payment 
approach of White (2002), but the variable fine of the latter rather than the fixed fine assumed by 
Ozanne et al. This integrated model shows that, contrary to White (2002), the input quota and 
input charges approaches lead to identical outcomes in terms of abatement levels, compensation 
payments, monitoring costs, probabilities and social welfare. 3 
1.  Introduction 
Moxey, White and Ozanne (1999) use a principal-agent model to show how transfer payments 
coupled with input quotas can be used to design optimal truth-telling mechanisms for voluntary 
agri-environmental schemes such as Countryside Stewardship, Nitrate Sensitive Area Scheme 
and Environmental Sensitive Area Scheme.  The solution results in a menu of contracts specified 
in terms of transfer payments and input quotas.  Producers choose the contract for their type:  
high compliance cost producers choose a high input quota and low transfer payment contract 
while low compliance cost producers choose a low quota and high transfer payment contract. 
  Moxey et al. only considered the hidden information (or adverse selection) aspect of 
asymmetric information problem facing a regulator. However, if the regulator cannot observe 
post-contractual input use and therefore has to incur monitoring costs to ensure that farmers 
comply with contracts, there is a hidden action problem as well. Ozanne, Hogan and Colman 
(2001) adapted the Moxey et al. model to analyze hidden action in such schemes, showing that, 
because  of  the  trade-off  between  increased  environmental  benefit  and  increased  cost  of 
monitoring compliance, only a second-best solution can be obtained. Taken together these two 
papers provide a theoretical framework that covers both types of information asymmetry in agri-
environmental policy, but treating  them separately.  White (2002)  extended the Moxey  et al. 
model to analyze the design of contracts under both hidden action and hidden information, but 
used  an  input  charge/transfer  payment  approach  rather  than  the  original  input  quota/transfer 
payment one. In addition, he assumed that farmers caught cheating face a variable fine, related to 
the amount of input they apply in excess of the amount agreed in the contract, rather than a fixed 
fine as assumed by Ozanne et al. White argues that his results show that an input charge/transfer 
payment policy is more efficient than a quota when the regulator cannot observe compliance 
costs of individual farmers. 
This paper integrates the previous work, developing a model of both hidden action and 
hidden  information  in  agri-environmental  schemes.  The  model  is  based  on  the  input 
quota/transfer payment approach of Moxey et al. (1999) and Ozanne et al. (2001), rather than the 
input charge/transfer payment approach of White (2002), but the variable fine of the latter rather 4 
than the fixed fine assumed by Ozanne et al..1  This integrated model shows that, contrary to 
White (2002), the input quota and input charges approaches lead to identical outcomes in terms 
of  optimal  abatement  levels,  compensation  payments,  monitoring  costs  and  probabilities  of 
detection, and social welfare. 
 
2.  The model 
Agri-environmental policy is modeled as a social welfare maximization problem that recognizes 
the constraints facing policy-makers due to information asymmetry and the costs of monitoring 
contracts  with  farmers.  The  following  sections  use  principal-agent  theory  to  model  agri-
environmental contracts between a regulator and farmers, progressing from a situation where the 
regulator has perfect information, through separate models for hidden information and hidden 
action, to an integrated model which includes hidden information, hidden action and the cost of 
monitoring compliance. 
 
2.1  Perfect information 
Adopting the approach and notation used by Moxey et al. (1999), it is assumed that the regulator 
aims to maximize a social welfare function with three terms: 
 
   zi = v(
*
i x  - xi) + (bi - ci(xi)) - (1+ e)bi    i=1,2      (1) 
 
where farmer 2 is assumed to be more efficient than farmer 1. 
The  first  term  on  the  right  hand  side  of  equation  (1)  represents  the  benefit  of  input 
abatement, where xi* is the optimal input level used by farmer i if he or she does not participate 
in the scheme, xi is the agreed input quota if she participates, and v measures the environmental 
benefit per unit of input abatement. The second term, (bi – ci(xi)), gives the i’th farmer's monetary 
                                                 
1 Note that, in amalgamating the models, it has been necessary, for the sake of consistency, to 
make minor notational adjustments when summarizing the models presented in Ozanne et al. and 
White. These adjustments are not always pointed out, but have no significant impact on the 
results and should not present any difficulty to the careful reader. 5 
utility (or rent) as the difference between the transfer payment, bi, offered to induce participation 
and the cost of compliance, ci(xi), where the latter function is defined as the profit forgone, 
 
ci(xi) = pi(xi*) - pi(xi)                (2) 
 
with ci’(x)<0, ci’’(x)>0, c1(x)>c2(x) and c1’(x)>c2’(x) by definition (see Moxey et al., 1999, for a 
more detailed discussion of the properties of the compliance cost function). 
The final term on the right-hand side is the net social cost of the transfer payment, where 
e represents the shadow costs of public funds in terms of the distortionary effects of general 
taxation. This specification of objective function assumes that the scheme applies to a small area 
relative  to  the  total  agricultural area, so that price  effects are zero.  It also assumes that  the 
benefits from contracting with one farm do not depend on any other farms joining the scheme; 
this enables us to use a linear benefits of abatement function. 
If the regulator has perfect information about the farmer’s compliance cost function and 
the farmer’s actions ex post, the objective function (1) is maximized subject to the individual 
rationality (IRi) constraints,  
 
  bi - ci(xi) ³ 0    i=1,2              (3) 
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- = ¢
1
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where  i x ˆ  is the optimal input quota for the i’th farmer when the regulator has perfect information 
and  the  corresponding  transfer  payment  is  ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ˆ *
i i i i i x x c b p p - = = .  Together,  the  contracts 
( i x ˆ , i b ˆ )  represent  the  first-best  solution  to  the  problem  facing  the  regulator.  Equation  (4) 
indicates that these contracts ensure that the marginal cost of compliance is equal to the marginal 
benefit of abatement to society. These contracts, arrived at using the input quota/transfer payment 6 
approach, are effectively identical  to perfect information contracts obtained by White (2002, 
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where ti is the input charge, since social welfare is maximized when  ti = - ci’(xi). 
 
2.2  Hidden information with first-best contracts 
If the regulator offers the first-best contracts ( i x ˆ , i b ˆ ) but cannot observe farmer type, there is an 
incentive for the less efficient farmer, type 1, to be declare that he or she is a more efficient 
farmer, since obtaining contract ( 2 ˆ x , 2 ˆ b ) by this deception earns rent: 
 
2 ˆ b – c1( 2 ˆ x ) > 0      since IR2 is binding and therefore      c1( 2 ˆ x ) < c2( 2 ˆ x ) =  2 ˆ b  
 
Note, however, that a similar incentive to be “economical with the truth” does not exist for the 
more efficient farmer, who would be worse of if he or she obtained contract ( 1 ˆ x , 1 ˆ b ): 
 
1 ˆ b – c2( 1 ˆ x ) < 0      since IR1 is binding and therefore     1 ˆ b = c1( 1 ˆ x ) < c2( 1 ˆ x ) 
 
Thus, offering the first-best menu of contracts when there is hidden information is costly 
to the regulator since total transfer payments increase while overall abatement decreases. The 
regulator may reduce the cost of the scheme by only offering contract ( 1 ˆ x , 1 ˆ b ). However, this will 
only attract the less efficient farmers and abatement will be lower than desired. 
 
2.3  Hidden information: second-best contracts 
The Moxey et al., 1999, model was based on the assumption that, although the regulator is 
unable to observe whether individual farmers are more or less efficient, it does have subjective 
prior probabilities, gi, for the two types as well as being able to observe farmer's actions ex post. 
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subject  to  the  individual  rationality  constraints  (3)  and  hidden  information  incentive 
compatibility (HIICi) constraints, 
 
  bi - ci(xi) ³  bj - ci(xj)    i, j = 1,2; i ¹ j.       (7) 
 
which ensure that there is no incentive for either producer to choose the wrong contract. Moxey 
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2 2 2 = - x c b                 (11) 
 
From equation (8) it can be seen that the input quota offered to the less efficient farmer is the 
same  as  under  perfect  information,  i.e.  1 ˆ ˆ x = 1 ˆ x .  However,  equation  (9)  shows  that,  since 
c1’(x)>c2’(x) by definition, the quota offered to the more efficient farmer is higher than in the 
first-best solution; i.e. abatement is reduced,  2 ˆ ˆ x > 2 ˆ x . Furthermore, although equation (11) shows 
that the transfer payment offered the more efficient farmer equals his or her cost of compliance, 
equation (10) shows that the less efficient retains some rent. 8 
  The corresponding hidden information contracts obtained by White, 2002, equations (10) 
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  White does not point this out, but, as in the perfect information case, these second-best 
contracts under hidden information - using the input quota/transfer payment approach and input 
quota/transfer payment approaches respectively - are effectively identical. For the less efficient 
farmer,  this  is  obvious  from  equations  (8)  and  (11).  It  is  less  obvious,  from comparison of 
equations (9) and (12), for the more efficient farmer, but nevertheless true, since it is simple to 
show that as c i’(tj)= xi(tj), 
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Thus, when hidden information alone is considered, the input abatement levels, compensation 
payments, social welfare and informational efficiency losses are exactly the same whether agri-
environmental contracts are designed using an input charge or input quota approach. 
 
2.4  Hidden action 
If the regulator observes the farm type but not the farm’s input use without monitoring, there is 
an incentive for both types of farmers to accept the appropriate contract, but exceed the input 
quota stipulated in the contract (or implied by the input charge), whilst claiming the full transfer 
payment. Ozanne et al., 2001, and White, 2002, both show monitoring can reduce this hidden 
action problem, but that, because there is a trade-off between input abatement and the monitoring 9 
costs borne by the taxpayer, input abatement is lower than under perfect information. However, 
there are differences in how they model the situation. 
Both assume that the regulator monitors input use and fines any farmer found not be 
complying with the terms of the agreed contract. Monitoring is assumed to be perfectly accurate 
in the sense that when a farm is monitored the regulator observes the input level without error. 
The fine level is exogenous, but the regulator can determine the probability of detection by 
varying the frequency of monitoring.2  However, White assumes farmers caught cheating face a 
variable fine, which is proportional to the quantity of input they apply in excess of the reported 
amount,  whereas  Ozanne  et  al.  assume  a  fixed  fine.  In  addition,  Ozanne  et  al.  assume  the 
compensation payment is confiscated, while White does not. 
Here, a mixture of the above approaches is followed. The input quota/transfer payment 
approach is used, as in Moxey et al. and Ozanne et al. However, transfer payments are not 
confiscated and fines are not fixed; rather, as in White’s model, it is assumed, that the penalty for 
non-compliance is a fine of h per unit of input in excess of the agreed quota, where h is the same 
for both types of farmer. The regulator offers farmers a menu of contracts, comprising of input 
quotas, transfer payments and monitoring regimes. The probability of detecting non-compliance 
for the i’th farmer, corresponding to the respective monitoring frequency, is set at pi. In addition, 
for  simplicity,  monitoring  costs  are  assumed  to  be  linear,  mpi,  where  the  parameter  m 
representing the cost of monitoring a farm with certainty, p=1, is the same for both farm types. 
Thus, the regulator’s objective function is:3 
 
   zi = v(
*
i x  - xi) + (bi - ci(xi)) - (1+ e)(bi + mpi)    i=1,2    (14) 
 
                                                 
2 It is a standard result that regulators prefer high penalties as this reduces the frequency of 
monitoring and thus monitoring costs.  However, penalties for non-compliance have tended to be 
low and the legislation establishing agri-environmental schemes has not allowed regulators to set 
their own penalties (National Audit Office, 1997). 
3 White’s original specification does not allow for the net social cost of monitoring to the 
taxpayer by multiplying the final term in the social welfare function, mpi, by (1+e). Here we 
follow Ozanne et al., who do. 10 
White demonstrates that, to ensure incentive compatibility, monitoring must be set such 
that ti = pih, that is the input charge is equal to the expected fine per unit of input, and replaces 
the last term in the objective function with mti/h. For, if ti > pih risk neutral producers would 
have an incentive to under report input use.  On the other hand, if ti < pih  monitoring costs 
would be excessive, since setting pi such that ti = pih  is sufficient to ensure compliance. Using 
the input quota/transfer payment approach, this is equivalent to introducing the explicit hidden 
action incentive compatibility (HAICi) constraints, 
 
pih ³ - ci’(xi)                 (15) 
 
into the model. These HAICi constraints state that, to deter cheating, the expected fines per unit 
of abatement must be at least as great as the marginal profits foregone (recalling equation (2)) for 
the respective farm types. They follow directly from White’s characterization of the monitoring 
regime, since ti = - ci’(xi).  They may also be derived by noting that, in order to deter cheating, 
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In the limit  i i x x ˆ ˆ ®  the fraction in the last equation becomes the marginal cost of compliance, 
) ˆ ˆ ( i i x c¢ . 
The hidden action model can now be solved by maximizing social welfare (14) subject to 
the  IRi  constraints  (3),  the  HAICi  constraints  (15),  the  non-negativity  constraints,  xi³0  and 
bi³0, and  the  probability  of  detection  constraints,  0£pi£1.  The  internal  solution  for  the 11 
regulator,  yielding  the  optimal  input  quotas,  transfer  payments  and  detection  probabilities 
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Equation (16) confirms that, since ci’’(xi)>0 by definition, the quota offered to the more efficient 
farmer is higher than in the first-best solution; i.e. abatement is reduced,  i x ˆ ˆ > i x ˆ , for both types of 
farmer. Once again, taking account of minor notational adjustments and the fact that here we 
have allowed for the social cost of monitoring to the taxpayer, it can be seen that the above is 
identical  to  the  solution  obtained  by  White,  2002,  using  the  input  charge/transfer  payment 
approach, 
 

































  The model presented above adopts the variable fine approach of White, 2002, rather than 
the fixed fine approach of Ozanne et al., 2001. For the sake of completeness, it can be readily 
shown that the above solution is identical to that obtained by Ozanne et al.. For, if instead of 
specifying a fine per unit input, h, the regulator imposes fixed fines, Fi, where, 
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equation (16) can be rewritten as, 12 
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which  is  the  Ozanne  et  al.  solution  for  risk  neutral  farmers  and  linear  monitoring  cost  and 
environmental benefit functions. It will be noted that this requires differing fines for the two 
types of farmer, F1 ¹ F2, whereas the variable fine approach assumes the two types of farmer face 
the same fine per unit of input in excess of the quota, h, if they are found in breach of contract. 
  
2.5  Hidden information and hidden action 
If  the  regulator  observes  neither  the  farm  type  nor  their  actions  there  is  potential  for  a 
combination of both hidden information (adverse selection) and hidden action (moral hazard) 
problems to occur. Amalgamating the models presented in sections 2.3 and 2.4, the regulator's 
problem is then to maximize the expected social welfare function: 
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subject to the IRi constraints (3), HIICi constraints (7), HAICi constraints (15), non-negativity, 
xi³0  and  bi³0, and  probability  of  detection  (or  monitoring  frequency)  constraints,  0£pi£1. 
Assuming a separating solution holds, so that IR2 and HIIC1 and both the HAICi constraints are 
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  Once adjustments have been made for minor changes in notation and treatment of the 
social cost of monitoring, it can be seen that the above is identical to White’s separating solution 
obtained using the input charge/transfer payment approach, 
 



























) ( ) ( (
) 1 ( 2 2











since social welfare is maximized when ti = - ci’(xi) and, as shown in sections 2.3 and 2.4, 
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3.  Conclusion 
Using principal-agent theory, agri-environmental policy has been modeled as a social 
welfare  maximization  problem  that  recognizes  the  constraints  facing  policy-makers  due  to 
information asymmetry and the social costs of monitoring contracts with farmers. Previous work 
by Moxey et al. (1999), Ozanne et al. (2001) and White (2002) has been combined to provide a 
model of both hidden action and hidden information in agri-environmental schemes. The model 
utilizes the input quota/transfer payment approach of Moxey et al. (1999) and Ozanne et al. 
(2001), rather than the input charge/transfer payment approach of White (2002), but the variable 
fine of the latter rather than the fixed fine assumed by Ozanne et al. It has been shown that, 
contrary  to  White  (2002),  the  input  quota  and  input  charges  approaches  lead  to  identical 14 
outcomes  in  terms  of  optimal  abatement  levels,  compensation  payments,  monitoring  costs, 
detection probabilities and social welfare. 
  It is intended that further work will extend the model to allow for farmer risk aversion, as 
in Ozanne et al. (2001), and use numerical simulations - based on plausible representations of 
production technology, farmer’s risk preferences and monitoring costs - to analyze the relative 
importance  of  hidden  information  and  hidden  action  in  the  design  of  agri-environmental 
contracts. Other possible areas include the effects of income uncertainty (as in Fraser, 2002) and 
repeated  contracts  (as  in  Hogan,  2002),  and  extending  the  two-producer  type  model  to  a 
continuum of producer types (as in White and Ozanne, 1997). 
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